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An illusory sensation of ownership over a surrogate limb or whole
body can be induced through specific forms of multisensory
stimulation, such as synchronous visuotactile tapping on the
hidden real and visible rubber hand in the rubber hand illusion.
Such methods have been used to induce ownership over a manikin
and a virtual body that substitute the real body, as seen from first-
person perspective, through a head-mounted display. However,
the perceptual and behavioral consequences of such transformed
body ownership have hardly been explored. In Exp. 1, immersive
virtual reality was used to embody 30 adults as a 4-y-old child
(condition C), and as an adult body scaled to the same height as
the child (condition A), experienced from the first-person perspec-
tive, and with virtual and real body movements synchronized. The
result was a strong body-ownership illusion equally for C and A.
Moreover there was an overestimation of the sizes of objects
compared with a nonembodied baseline, which was significantly
greater for C compared with A. An implicit association test showed
that C resulted in significantly faster reaction times for the
classification of self with child-like compared with adult-like
attributes. Exp. 2 with an additional 16 participants extinguished
the ownership illusion by using visuomotor asynchrony, with all
else equal. The size-estimation and implicit association test differ-
ences between C and A were also extinguished. We conclude that
there are perceptual and probably behavioral correlates of body-
ownership illusions that occur as a function of the type of body in
which embodiment occurs.
body awareness | self consciousness | perceptual illusion
How would it be to have the body of a child again, and howwould this change perception of the world and your atti-
tudes toward yourself and others? In this article we address this
question in the context of body-ownership illusions. The issue of
how the brain represents the body has been approached exten-
sively in philosophy (1, 2), cognitive neuroscience (3–5), robotics
(6, 7), and virtual environments (8, 9). It has been demonstrated
that it is straightforward to generate the illusion in people that
their body has changed (1, 10–16). In particular, immersive vir-
tual reality (IVR) has been used as a compelling way to ma-
nipulate and introduce illusions with respect to the body
representation of people in terms of structure, size, and mor-
phology. It has been shown that specific types of synchronous
multisensory and sensorimotor stimulation can lead to illusory
perceptions of body shape, size, and symmetry even when these
are very different from the normal body form (17–23). In other
words, there have been significant demonstrations that percep-
tual ownership of a body that may be quite different to your own
is possible through particular types of multisensory stimulation.
Although previous work has focused on the phenomena of
body ownership and explanations for it, here we show that the
form of the body, in terms of the relative proportions of head
size, trunk, and limbs, can impact size-perceptions of the external
world and reaction-time behaviors in the selection of categories
that compare the self with others. To achieve this end, we carried
out two experiments. In the first, we embodied adults in the virtual
body of a toddler (about 4-y-old) and as a control in a virtual body
of the same size but representing a scaled-down adult body. The
virtual body moved in real-time determined by the actual move-
ments of the participant. The second experiment was carried out
as a further control with the same child or scaled-down adult body,
but where the virtual bodies moved asynchronously with respect to
the real movements of the participants. This control was to ex-
amine what would happen when participants did not have the
ownership illusion over their virtual body. The results of these
experiments show the illusion of ownership over the child body has
different perceptual and behavioral consequences than ownership
over the scaled-down adult body form.
The effect of embodiment regarding perception of age and
how that can influence subsequent behavior has not yet been
extensively addressed in literature. Hershfield et al. (24) used
IVR to expose participants to their future-aged selves to study
the impact on attitudes toward monetary saving for the future.
The results suggested that those interacting with their future
selves later focused on long-term implications of choices and
exhibited increased preferences for larger rewards later in life.
Yee and Bailenson (25) found that negative stereotyping of the
elderly was significantly reduced when participants were placed
in avatars of old people compared with those participants placed
in avatars of young people.
Moreover, behavioral changes via an altered self-representa-
tion have been partially addressed by researchers with respect to
on-line 3D worlds and IVR. Yee and Bailenson (26) examined
how one’s self-representation can influence interaction with
others, specifically by using more attractive or taller virtual
characters. The authors refer to this as the “Proteus effect.”
Further studies have focused on avatar appearance and its effect
on behavior and cognition (27).
What is the link, however, between an altered representation
of oneself and the perception of the surrounding environment?
It has been suggested that body size serves as a fundamental
reference in visual perception of object size (28), but also that
the combination of information from different visual and ocu-
lomotor cues also affects this perception (29). Previous studies
have shown, for example, that hand size affects the perceived
sizes of external objects (30, 31). Besides the size of specific body
parts in the perception of the external world, the role of whole-
body scaling has also been studied recently. Van der Hoort,
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Guterstam, and Ehrsson (22) studied the sense of body owner-
ship and the effect on object sizes and distances where the seen
body is a relative size cue. For this purpose, manikin bodies of
different sizes were used, and participants experienced owner-
ship of abnormally large and small bodies. The results demon-
strated that the visual perception of distance and object sizes is
affected by one’s own multisensory body representation. Is size,
however, the only factor influencing perception of the sur-
rounding environment or do additional bottom-up and top-down
influences play a role in spatial awareness?
All of us can recall childhood memories and the environment
in which they were set. We often find it surprising how objects
that we found gigantic back then now seem considerably smaller,
for example, when revisiting our childhood school. The experi-
ment reported here addresses the question as to how embodi-
ment of adults in a body of a child might influence size-perception
of the environment and categorizations of self compared with
others. We compare embodiment in a child (or “toddler” body)
with embodiment in that of a scaled-down adult body of the
same size. We consider three issues: First, whether there is
evidence of an illusion of body ownership with respect to these
two virtual bodies, and in particular whether the strength of the
illusion differs between the two body types. Second, whether
perception of size of the surrounding environment is influenced
by the virtual body form. Third, whether there is a difference in
reaction times in attributing child-like or adult-like attributes
to the self.
Results
Exp. 1 had a single factor (body form) with two conditions. In
condition C, participants were embodied in the body of a child
(Fig. 1A). In condition A, they were embodied in a scaled-down
adult body of the same height as that in C (Fig. 1B). The height
(of 91.5 cm) represented a child of about 4 y old. Embodiment
was through first-person viewpoint from the eyes of the virtual
body that substituted the own body with synchronous visuomotor
feedback, so that as the person moved their virtual body moved
in real-time and synchronously (Movie S1). The eye heights were
identical in both conditions.
The experiment was conducted as a within-group counter-
balanced design originally with 32 participants (n = 16 in each
condition). Two participants were excluded from the analysis
because of the lack of data during the second condition of the
experiment (final, n = 15 in each condition). Participants were
randomly allocated to one of the two groups, regarding whether
they first experienced a child virtual body and then an adult body
or an adult body first and then a child body. Their two trials were
separated by 1 wk. The experimental design is shown in Table S1.
Body Representation Questionnaire. First, we examine the extent of
body ownership with respect to the two virtual bodies of con-
ditions C and A. Participants completed a questionnaire after
each experimental condition (Table S2). The box plot (Fig. 2A)
of questionnaire responses for the ownership illusion questions
Q1 (VRBody) and Q2 (Mirror) shows that participants tended to
affirm the illusion of ownership with respect to the child and the
adult body, and that there was no significant difference between
the two conditions. To test these hypotheses, we used the Fried-
man nonparametric test for two-way layouts, with the trial number
as the blocking factor (for VRBody χ21 = 0:05, P = 0.82, for Mirror
χ21 = 0:16, P = 0.69). The median scores for Q4 (TwoBodies) are
each 0, with no difference between the conditions (χ21 = 0:12, P =
0.73). The median score for Q3 (Features) is significantly lower in
the Child condition (median = −2) than the Adult condition
(median = −1) (χ21 = 5:32, P = 0.02), which is consistent with
participants recognizing the difference between the two bodies,
although it should be noted that both scores are very low.
Effect of Body Form on Size Estimation. A major issue of the study
was to investigate the relationship between body form and the
perceived sizes of objects in the environment. Our expectation
was that condition C would result in greater overestimation of
sizes compared with condition A, although based on previous
literature, we expected overestimation in both conditions. Par-
ticipants were trained to hold their hands apart with the distance
between the two hands representing the estimated sizes of
objects. The locations of the two hands were tracked and the
distance between them recorded (Fig. S1A). Participants were
required to carry out these estimations twice, for three differ-
ently sized cubes (15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm); they had previously had
training on this method of size estimation (Materials and Meth-
ods). The first estimates were obtained after they had entered the
virtual environment but before embodiment in a virtual body,
where they made three estimates for each object. Then, after
some experience of being in the virtual body, the participants
were required to make the estimations again. The full procedure
for training and measurement is described in SI Materials and
Methods. We took the mean of nine estimates as their final es-
timate for each size estimation, as each object was measured
three times in random order at three different locations, all at
the same distance from the participant (0.6 cm) and with the
same orientation (Fig. S1 B–D). The differences between the mean
size estimates during the embodiment phase and the preem-
bodiment mean estimates are denoted by dmean15, dmean30,
and dmean45. One extreme outlier was detected, which was
removed from all analyses involving these means (Fig. S2 and
Dataset S1).
The results (Fig. 2C) show that there is a significantly greater
overestimation of size in condition C compared with condition
A. This finding is confirmed by a within-groups ANOVA: dmean15:
F(1, 28) = 11.37, P = 0.002; dmean30: F(1, 28) = 16.43, P =
0.0004; dmean45: F(1, 28) = 8.92, P = 0.006. The Shapiro–Wilk
test shows compatibility of the residual errors of the fit with
normality for dmean15 and dmean30 (both P > 0.89) but not so
for dmean45 (P = 0.03, although the distribution of residual
errors is clearly symmetric about 0 and bell-shaped). It should be
noted that in the adult condition the differences are significantly
greater than 0, consistent with earlier results (22) that the scaled-
down body does result in object size overestimation (t tests all
P < 0.00005).
Fig. 1. Experimental setup. The body of the participant was substituted
by a sex-matched virtual body, viewed from first-person perspective, onto
which body and head movements were mapped in real time. The body could
also be seen as reflected in a virtual mirror as shown. The body each par-
ticipant viewed depended on the condition C (for child) or A (for adult) to
which each one was assigned. (A) A female participant in a child’s body. (B) A
female participant in a scaled-down adult’s body. (C) Participants’ body
movements were tracked by 34 Optitrack markers.
























Implicit Association Test Scores. Participants completed an Implicit
Association Test (IAT) (32) at the end of both conditions and
while still in the virtual environment. This IAT paired child or
adult with self and other categories. The results show that par-
ticipants in the child condition C responded faster when the self
was paired with child images (Me-C) than when the self was
paired with adult images (Me-A). On the other hand, partic-
ipants in the adult condition A had faster response times for Me-
A pairs than for Me-C pairs. In the interpretation of the IAT
scores, positive scores reflect stronger associations for Me-C
relatively to Me-A. Fig. 2E shows that the IAT C scores are
greater than the A scores. The within-groups ANOVA shows
that the difference in means between the conditions is significant
[F(1, 29) = 22.12, P = 0.0001, and Shapiro–Wilk test for nor-
mality P = 0.49].
Exp. 2: The Influence of Body Ownership. The analysis above shows
that there is a significant effect of the type of body; that is, the
child body leads to higher IAT scores and overestimation of
object sizes compared with the adult body. However, we are
interested in whether it was the illusion of body ownership that
contributed to these effects. To this end, Exp. 2 was designed to
diminish the degree of body ownership by using visuomotor in-
congruence. Another 16 people were recruited from the same
population as Exp. 1. These participants completed the full ex-
periment in the same session, with counterbalanced order (either
child embodiment first or adult embodiment first). However,
whereas in Exp. 1 there was real-time synchrony between the
movements of the participant and the movements of the virtual
body, in this case the virtual body moved asynchronously with
respect to the movements of the participant, although seen from
exactly the same perspective condition as in Exp. 1 (Movie S1).
In other words, in Exp. 2 participants saw the virtual body from
a first-person perspective and in the mirror as before, but its
movements were not those of the participant. Based on previous
research (17, 20, 33–35), we expected this aspect to reduce the
degree of body ownership (SI Text, Table S3).
Indeed, this result is what happened, as can be seen in Fig. 2B.
For example, for Q1 (VRBody) and Q2 (Mirror), the medians
are both −2 in all asynchronous conditions, compared with 1 in
all synchronous conditions. (Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
comparing VRBody between synchronous and asynchronous
Fig. 2. Box and bar plots of questionnaire, size estimations, and IAT results by the Adult and Child conditions for Exps. 1 and 2. (A and B) Box plots for
questionnaire results on body ownership (see Table S2) for Exps. 1 and 2, respectively. The thicker horizontal lines are the medians and the boxes the
interquartile ranges. (C and D) Bar chart size-estimation results for Exps. 1 and 2. The heights are means and the bars SEMs. The variable dmean15, dmean30,
and dmean45 are the differences between the postembodiment size estimations and preembodiment (baseline) size estimations, for the boxes of the three
different sizes. (E and F) Bar charts for the IAT results for Exps. 1 and 2. A higher IAT score represents faster response times for self compared with child
categories. Significance levels are given in the text.
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conditions P < 0.00005, and for Mirror P = 0.0001. There are no
significant differences for Features or TwoBodies).
Fig. 2D shows the bar charts for dmean15, dmean30, and
dmean45 in the asynchronous condition. It is evident that there
are no differences between the child and adult conditions. The
within-group ANOVAs have all P > 0.80 for the difference be-
tween C and A in this asynchronous setup (and all satisfy nor-
mality using the Shapiro–Wilk test all P > 0.68). Similarly, Fig.
2F shows the IAT results, with no difference between C and A
(within-groups ANOVA P = 0.65, Shapiro–Wilk P = 0.10).
Taking both experiments together, “synchronous” is a be-
tween-group factor and condition (A or C) is a within-group
factor. As can be seen from Fig. 2 C and D, for dmean15 the
within-groups main effect difference between A and C is signif-
icant [F(1,43) = 5.67, P = 0.02], with a significant interaction
between condition and synchronous [F(1,43) = 5.50, P = 0.02].
The residual errors satisfy normality (Shapiro–Wilk P = 0.26).
The findings are similar for dmean30: the within-groups condi-
tion main effect F(1,43) = 8.73, P = 0.005, interaction F(1,43) =
7.68, P = 0.008, Shapiro–Wilk P = 0.97. For dmean45: the within-
groups main effect is P = 0.05, and interaction effect P = 0.04.
This time normality is not satisfied (Shapiro–Wilk P = 0.001) but
the residual error distribution is highly symmetric. As before,
each of dmean15, dmean30, and dmean45 are significantly
greater than 0 (t tests, all P < 0.0001), showing that there was an
overestimation of size.
For IAT (Fig. 2 E and F), the within-groups main effect for
condition has F(1,44) = 9.01, P = 0.004, with interaction effect F
(1,44) = 4.72, P = 0.035 (Shapiro–Wilk P = 0.86). The significant
interaction effects are all critical in demonstrating that the re-
lationship between responses in the adult and child conditions
were different, depending on whether there was asynchronous or
synchronous visuomotor feedback. The former is associated with
a low level of body ownership and the latter with a high level.
Discussion
Our first result is that it is possible to generate a subjective il-
lusion of ownership with respect to a virtual body that represents
a child and a scaled-down adult of the same size when there is
real-time synchronous movement between the real and virtual
body. The illusion is extinguished when the virtual body moves
asynchronously compared with the real body. It was found that
there were no significant differences with respect to body own-
ership between the child and adult condition. This result is not
surprising and is in line with earlier results that it is possible to
generate such illusions with different body forms (15, 19, 21, 23),
including very small or large bodies (22). This result serves
mainly as a reference point, to show that there is no difference in
the extent of the illusion of ownership over the adult and child
body forms in Exp. 1 that could account for the other findings.
Our second result concerned object size estimation in the dif-
ferent body forms. It has been argued that body size serves a ref-
erence for the external world, and earlier studies using IVR have
examined how the perception of one’s body size influences the
perception of spatial layouts (22). Other studies (e.g. refs. 33 and
34), show that scaling one’s body size up or down proportionally
results in perceiving the world as smaller or larger respectively.
The results of our study go one step beyond this. We have shown
that although there was an overestimation by the A group, as
would be expected, there was an even greater overestimation by
the C group compared with the A group (Fig. 2C). Hence, as well
as body size influencing the estimation of the sizes of objects in the
environment, there must be an additional underlying mechanism
relating to perception of the form of the own body. The findings
support the notion that higher-level cognitive processes (i.e., the
implications of the form of the body in terms of how it represents
age) can influence our perceptual interpretation of sizes of objects
in the external world other than body size alone.
Our third result shows an impact of body form on self- and
other-categorization (measured by reaction times) with respect
to classification of the self as a child or as an adult, where those
in the C body responded significantly faster to self-categorization
with child-like attributes compared with those in the A body. In
the late 1980s, Jaron Lanier was the first to realize that IVR
could be used for body transformation (discussed in ref. 35) and
previous research has focused on demonstrating how an avatar’s
visual appearance can influence participants. Yee and Bailenson
(26) examined how manipulating the online self-representation
can cause changes in the behavior of people embodied in avatars
(their notion of the Proteus effect). However, this earlier work
does not provide evidence that body ownership can affect atti-
tudes and behavior intrapersonally. First, there was no notion of
or attempt to measure the degree of body ownership; and sec-
ond, their theoretical framework describes how an external
perceiver can possibly influence the user of an avatar through
interpersonal communication behavior (i.e., when interacting or
communicating with others). As Yee and Bailenson (26) have
pointed out, behaviors can be influenced by assumptions about
how one would believe others would expect them to behave. As
they state, “the false self-concept (i.e. self-stereotyping) may
override behavioral confirmation” (26), discussing the possibility
of a feedback effect playing a role in their findings. The concept
of the feedback loop, as described in Walther’s (36) hyper-
personal model, suggests that behavior can be influenced in on-
line interactive conversations by behavioral expectations of the
conversation partner, which in turn can also influence the be-
havior of this partner. Another study has also focused on how an
avatar’s appearance can affect the behavior and cognition of the
participant (27) by making the user more or less confident,
friendly, aggressive, negative, or intimate. In that study however,
the hypothesis was based on how the manipulation of outer
appearance and clothing contribute to the argued effect.
Therefore, no direct manipulation of the bodily self-represen-
tation and type of body was engaged.
In our study we concentrated on manipulating solely the bodily
self-representation and on the consequences of this in sub-
sequent perception and attitudes. No external factors, such as
social interaction, were present, and participants were alone
rather than in social settings. Furthermore, this study is in-
novative in the way that takes into account the virtual repre-
sentation in a body of a different age—a child—and on the
consequences of such a transformation on behavior and atti-
tudes. To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined the
effect of owning a body of a child in an experimental setup. The
results of the present study support the hypothesis that not only
did participants feel ownership of the child body, but that this
body transformation also affected their identification by modi-
fying their IAT responses.
Our fourth finding is that the size estimation and IAT results
were influenced by the extent of the illusion of body ownership.
Importantly, the size estimation and IAT responses compared
between high (synchronous) and low (asynchronous) ownership-
illusion conditions show that the difference in responses between
the C and A conditions only occur for the group with the higher
level of body-ownership illusion. This finding suggests that a
correlate of a body-ownership illusion is that the type of body
carries with it a set of temporary changes in perception and
behaviors that are appropriate to that type of body. Here it
relates to age, and everyone will have experiences of being 4 y
old, possibly with first-hand memories that may be triggered by
being embodied in and having strong agency over an apparent
4-y-old body. As noted by Vogeley and Fink (37) in their review
of the neural correlates of first-person perspective: “‘emotional
traces’ of past experiences trigger our actual decisions based
upon experiences similar to the actual experience.” The authors
also argue that our core self is reconstituted on a moment-
to-moment basis in the relationship between ourselves and the
external world, and that this is a “necessary component for the
so-called autobiographical self, that integrates particular states
of the core self over one’s personal life history” (37). In our
experiment we radically changed not only the relationship of the
self to the external world through the manipulation of size but
























also with respect to body type representing a profoundly differ-
ent age. Therefore, we would predict a triggering of past first-
person perspective experiences associated with being that
younger age that then influenced present-day perceptual and
attitudinal processing.
However, if the body type was not one that had been coded in
memory through previous experience, participants might be
influenced by socially and culturally derived expectations of what
it would be like to have a specific type of body. The recently
introduced framework of a cortical “body matrix” might explain
this. The body matrix is a multisensory representation of peri-
personal space and the space immediately around the body, in
a body-centered reference frame (38). According to this, and
a further interpretation in ref. 39, when multisensory data gen-
erates an illusion of change in the body structure, then the body
matrix maintains the homeostatic and psychological integrity of
the body to conform with the changed body. Our current results
suggest the intriguing possibility that this even extends to per-
ceptual processing and implicit attitudes and behaviors (40).
There is further evidence for this in recent experiments where
light-skinned people were induced to experience the illusion of
ownership over a black rubber arm (41) and over a dark-skinned
virtual body (42). In both cases, there was a reduction in implicit
racial bias associated only with the illusion of ownership of
a dark-skinned body. These experiments provide evidence sup-
porting the idea that it is not only prior experience of a body type
that influences the extent of perceptual, attitudinal, and behav-
ioral correlates of the body ownership illusion. However, more
work is required in this regard, including brain-imaging studies,
to help to understand the extent of cortical reorganization under
body illusions that result in such changes.
The experiments presented in this report confirm that altered
bodily self-representation can have a spontaneous and significant
influence on aspects of perception and behavior. It has been
shown that IVR supports global scaling of sizes, where the brain
automatically adjusts for the overall size of one’s avatar, which is
in line with past studies (22). Most importantly, our system can
reproduce the experience of the world “as a child experiences it,”
and not only as a simple linear transformation of size. Further-
more, a demonstration that avatars can change perception of our
selves has great potential in various applications and for the
interaction between participants. Finally, and importantly, it is
worth pointing out that as we choose our self-representations in
virtual reality settings, our behaviors may be shaped accordingly
(26); it is therefore not only the influence that users exert on
avatars, but essentially the impact of avatars on their users and
how they can shape their attitudes.
Materials and Methods
Exp. 1 was conducted as a within-groups counterbalanced design with
a single binary factor, referred to as “Body Form.” The first factor level
represented the body of a visually realistic 4-y-old child (condition C) and the
second level (condition A) (Fig. 1) represented the body as an adult but with
the same height as the child body (91.5 cm) by scaling down the adult body
to match the height of the child body. Both virtual bodies were dressed in
a similar way. The size of the virtual environment and proportions of the
content were equivalent to reality and identical in both conditions.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two designed groups,
regarding whether they first experienced a child virtual body and then an
adult body (C) or an adult body first and then a child body (A). The exper-
imental design can be seen in Table S1. Further details of experimental
procedures are provided in SI Materials and Methods.
Procedures. Participants attended the experiment at prearranged times.
Upon arriving, they were given an information sheet to read, and after they
agreed to continue with the experiment, they were given a consent form to
sign. Before the experiment started, participants were fitted with the head-
mounted display (HMD) and the body-tracking suit. The view seen through
the HMD was calibrated for each one of them.
The position of all participants was controlled through Velcro strips on the
floor, which were used to mark where they should stand during the ex-
periment. These positions corresponded to the center of the physical and
virtual room. Participants were instructed to turn and move their heads and
bodies but not walk away from that area unless requested otherwise by the
experimenter. That area was represented in the virtual environment by a
virtual carpet, on which participants were asked to stand.
During the first part of the experiment, participants entered a virtual
outdoor scene where they trained their object-size estimation capability,
thereby also familiarizing themselves with the task of estimating sizes of
objects in virtual reality. In this setup they had no virtual body. During this task
the participants were presented in random order with six virtual red color cubes
of different sizes (15, 25, 30, 45, 60, and 75 cm) in front of them over a period
of 5 min. All cubes were shown in the same position and at 0.6 m with the
same orientation. The position from which participants looked at the objects
was from a height of about 90 cm, equal to the height of the child and scaled
adult avatars. The participants were instructed to indicate the width of each
cube by raising their hands and hold them straight in front of them, as if they
would like to grasp it, and the size was measured as the distance between the
palms. The distance was calculated using the tracking devices on their hands
and was automatically recorded for each object separately. An offset cor-
responding to the distance between the tracking device and the participant’s
palms individually was also taken into account when estimating the final
results (the average among all participants was 8 cm) (Fig. S1A). After each
size estimation, participants were given visual feedback in the form of words
on the screen regarding their measurements that categorized their estima-
tions as “Too Big,” “Too Small,” or “Correct.” In cases where measurements
were other than “Correct,” participants were instructed to relax their arms
and try again, until they achieved a “Correct” feedback. Only then was the
next virtual object presented to them. Each measurement was classified with
a ±4-cm tolerance (e.g., for 15-cm virtual objects, “Correct” estimation
varied from 11 to 19 cm).
Next, participants removed the HMD and were asked to complete a per-
sonal traits questionnaire, the information from which was used later during
the IAT test. For example, participants had to provide their age, sex, pro-
fession, and other such individual information. Immediately after completing
the questionnaire they put on the HMD again, and the second and main part
of the experiment started. Participants entered the same training virtual
scene, still with no virtual body; they were asked to repeat the object-size
estimation task. Red-colored cubes of 15 cm, 30 cm, and 45 cm were each
presented three times in randomorder. Each virtual object remained visible in
front of participants at a constant distance (of 0.6 cm) for 5 s. After each cube
disappeared, they were asked to indicate their estimate by the distance
between their hands, and the measurements were recorded with the same
procedure as described before, but without any feedback as to the
correctness of the size estimations. This process provided the baseline
size estimations.
While participants wore the HMD they were asked to close their eyes,
during which time a new scene was loaded. This scene portrayed a virtual
living room decorated with everyday furniture, including a virtual mirror. The
body of the participant was substituted by a sex-matched virtual body, seen
from a first-person perspective. The participant’s head and body movements
were mapped in real time to the virtual body; they could see this body both
by looking toward directly toward their real body and also in the virtual
mirror. The body seen by each participant depended on the condition A or C.
A series of tasks were then assigned to the participants. First, they were
asked to perform a simple set of stretching exercises that had previously
been demonstrated to them by the experimenter, in order that they should
explore the capabilities and real-time motion of the virtual body, including
movements of their arms, legs, and feet. Participants were asked to continue
performing these exercises by themselves and also look around the virtual
room in all directions. During this visual exploration, participants were asked
to state and describe what they saw, to be sure that they were paying at-
tention. After the exploration period (5 min), the participants were asked to
repeat the size-estimation task, with no virtual body present. Each object
was measured three times in random order at three different locations, all at
the same distance from the participant equal to that of the control mea-
surements and with the same orientation (Fig. S1 B–D). The heights at which
each object was placed were always the same, and were the same as in the
control condition.
Then participants were instructed to locate two virtual doors in the room
and face toward these. One door was to a room that looked like a child’s play-
room, and the second more like an adult sitting room (Fig. S3). We asked
participants to choose between these two virtual doors. The location of the
rooms in the environment was randomized across participants to avoid
choice based on adaptation. Participants were told that they would be given
only 4 s to make their choice before the doors closed. They were told that
any delay could result in failing the experiment.
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Finally, the participants completed the IAT (from within the HMD) and
after removing the HMD they were asked to complete the postexperimental
questionnaire. Next, the participants were paid and debriefed. The whole
procedure lasted between 45 and 60 min. The experimental operator (female)
was present throughout the whole experiment. All participants attended
the second trial of the experiment 1 wk after the first phase and the
procedures were identical to the ones presented above, except that the
avatar body used was the other one.
Exp. 2 was identical to Exp. 1, except that the virtual body moved in-
dependently of the movements of the participant and the second trial was
carried out on completion of the first (SI Text).
IAT Procedure. As described by Schnabel, Asendorpf, and Greenwald (32), the
“IAT measures are designed to assess automatic associations between
a contrasted pair of target. . . and attribute. . . concepts through a series of
discrimination tasks that require fast responding.” The target category in
the IAT design adapted for the current study refers to “Children versus
Adults” images; the attribute category to “Me versus Others” has personal
attributes in the form of words or short sentences.
The IAT was applied immediately after the exposure in the virtual envi-
ronment and while participants were still wearing the HMD through which
the test was displayed. A virtual reality wand was used by the participants to
make their selections by putting their left and right thumbs on the left and
right buttons, respectively (Fig. S4B). During the first IAT block, the partici-
pant was asked to categorize visual stimuli into the two target categories,
namely “Children” and “Adults” (Table S4). The stimuli were pictures of
adult and child faces appearing in the middle of the screen for the par-
ticipant to sort into the appropriate category. In the second block, the
participant was trained to press one button for “Me” attributes and the
other button for “Others” attributes. These attributes were presented as
written words. The attributes were personalized for each participant and
corresponded to preferences and personal data, such as their names, ages,
occupation, food/music, or other likes, life status, and so on. These personal
data and preferences had been obtained for each individual from the
questionnaire administered before they started the experiment. The third
and fourth blocks combined the target and the attribute discrimination that
were subdivided into two blocks of 40 trials each. The subsequent fifth block
reversed the target discrimination and the sixth and seventh blocks com-
bined again the attribute and the previously reversed target discrimination.
As has been shown, mean IAT scores tend to show slightly stronger associ-
ations corresponding to the pairings of the combined block that is com-
pleted first (43). To control for this effect, the order of combined blocks was
counterbalanced between participants as proposed by Nosek, Greenwald,
and Banaji (44).
Statistical Note. All ANOVAs were within-group (or within-group for condi-
tion and between-group when comparing results of Exps. 1 and 2), and all
allowed for sphericity computing both Greenhouse–Geisser and Huynh–Feld
e, which were equal to 1 in every case. The statistical software used was
Matlab for the nonparametric statistics and Stata 12 for the ANOVAs.
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